In the U.S. and Canada, point source dischargers must obtain permits to release emissions, whereas non-point source dischargers largely remain uninhibited by federal mandates . In these WQT programs, point sources trade with other point sources to avoid costly discharge reductions at their industrial facilities, and only a handful of non-point sources are involved on a voluntary basis . On the limited occasions that the agricultural industry does engage in trading, farm non-point sources almost always assume the roll of “sellers” in the program, rather than “buyers” . Under such circumstances, point source dischargers pay non-point sources to comply with water quality standards , creating a profit-making opportunity for agricultural pollution This lopsided relationship between point and non-point sources highlights another related problem: the absence of a fully capped trading system. Though trading schemes show promise in transitioning the regulatory framework from individual discharge limits to river basin management based on group controls, for the system to realize its full potential, all dischargers—point and non-point—must participate . A further complication, both in partially- and fully-capped WQT systems, is that of accounting for differences in emission loads between point and non-point sources. WQT programs utilize a trading ratio to calculate how many units of estimated non-point source loadings should be traded with a unit of point source loadings . Because of the uncertainty of non-point source loadings, trading ratios are almost always set at 2:1 or greater to create a margin of safety . In this scenario, point sources must purchase two units of estimated non-point reductions for every unit of excess emissions. Interestingly, a study on trading ratios found that political acceptability, rather than scientific information, determined ratio calculations . Despite the challenges,blueberry in pot several notable successes have demonstrated that enforced group caps, emission allocations, and water quality standards can be met.

For example, in 1995, farmers from the San Joaquin Valley, California implemented a tradable discharge permit system to enforce a regional cap on selenium discharges. The selenium program set a schedule of monthly and annual load limits, and imposed a penalty on violations of those limits . In Canada’s Ontario basin, a phosphorus trading program was established in which point sources purchase agricultural offsets rather than update their facilities . A third-party, South Nation Conservation, acts a facilitator, collecting funds from point sources and financing phosphorus-reducing agricultural projects. It is estimated that the program has prevented 11,843 kg of phosphorus from reaching waterways . Numerous other pilot trading projects show promise, but need a serious overhaul if they are to realize their full potential. One prominent example worth mentioning is the U.S.’s Chesapeake Bay Nutrient Trading program. In response to President Obama’s executive order to clean up the Chesapeake Bay, the largest estuary in North America, the six states contributing pollution to the Bay are in the national spotlight as they figure out how to achieve pollutant allocations. Currently, their plans to meet water quality requirements are falling short . Economic scholars contend that a nutrient trading plan could offer the most cost-effective means for complying with the looming TMDL. But, uncertainty about agricultural sources willingness to participate and what trading ratio is most appropriate as well as high transaction costs remain issues . The most traditional form of command-and-control regulation is performance standards. Though often presented as an alternative to market-based approaches, performance standards can complement a tax or emissions-trading system, and can also be used alongside positive incentive schemes. In an incentive approach, if pollution exceeds a standard then a financial penalty or charge might be triggered, whereas if a farmer is well within compliance, the farmer might receive a positive payoff for their efforts. Standards can also be used in trading through pollution allowances with enforceable requirements .

And in a mandate scenario, standards are compulsory, and may or may not be accompanied with other motivating devices .Performance standards have successfully reduced point source water pollution—E.U.’s IPPC Directive and U.S.’s NPDES program and pollution of other media . Unfortunately, the same suite of challenges—the use of proxies, costs of monitoring and modeling, and uncertainty of environmental outcomes—face performance standards within the context of non-point source abatement. These perceived obstacles have largely precluded the use of performance tools for agricultural NPS control . However, a growing body of literature expounds the benefits of using performance approaches for this industrial sector . Performance measures are used to encourage Best Management Practices . Using models to predict the level of BMP performance can provide powerful decision-making data to farmers, helping them make appropriate management decisions . Performance modeling is most effective when conducted at the field-scale. For example, the Performance-Based Environmental Policies for Agriculture initiative found that the implementation of BMPs, such as changing row directions or installing buffer strips, reduces the risk of pollution to varying degrees depending on several on-farm factors . Allowing farmers to exercise site-specific knowledge in an individualized context highlights an important, laudable feature of performance-based approaches: flexibility . Some suggests that practice-based tools, ones that mandate or incentivize the installation of certain BMPs, are not as cost-effective as their performance-based counterparts . This is largely due to the fact that performance-based instruments provide flexibility to choose the practices that will achieve water quality improvements at the lowest cost .In the case of agricultural water pollution, farmers are the predominant actors targeted for compliance. While logical, since farmers’ management practices influence the amount of pollution that reach nearby water bodies, however it is worth noting that other actors involved in the pollution process could be targeted for regulation.

For example, the control of pesticides has been managed by regulating the chemical manufacturer, imposing mandates or taxes on chemicals sold on the market . This type of tool could be highly effective in reducing the amount of pesticides or fertilizers produced, sold, bought, applied and discharged into water bodies, creating a ripple effect through the whole production stream. Targeting actors further “upstream” is illustrative of what Driesen and Sinden call a the “dirty input limit” or “DIL.” Manufacturing companies are only one of several points along the production stream where the DIL approach could be effective; alternatively, pollutants could be controlled at the point of application. As suggested by the authors, the DIL approach is useful beyond the tool choice framework in that it provokes a new way of thinking about environmental regulation. Among the least invasive , but most important instruments for successful NPS management, capacity tools provide information and/or other resources to help farmers make decisions to achieve societal and environmental goals. Capacity tools are typically associated with voluntary initiatives rather than mandates . Because it can be difficult for farmers to detect the water quality impacts of their practices visually ,plastic planters wholesale learning and capacity tools become an invaluable means of conveying information to farmers. Farmers’ perceptions of the water quality problem and their role in contributing to pollution are one of the most influential factors in changing farming management practices . In California, the Resource Conservation Districts, University of California Extension, and the University of California’s Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources are examples of local government agencies providing capacity building services that include knowledge, skills, training and information in order to change on-farm behavior. In summary, each policy tool possesses strengths and weaknesses, which need to be taken into consideration when developing more effective ways to control agricultural pollution. An integrated approach, one that utilizes a diversity of policy instruments to address water quality issues in agriculture, is required. River basin management plans , or the “watershed approach” as it is often referred to in the U.S., can more appropriately tailor their choice of policy tools to local conditions. Authority has been granted to achieve water quality objectives at the regional jurisdictional level. The success of these programs will largely depend on the wisdom and will of those regional governmental leaders , as discussed below.What are the major similarities and distinctions between different approaches to agricultural non-point source pollution regulation available in the U.S. and Europe? And, which are most effective? This chapter examined the defining characteristics and application of six policy tools, each of which have been proposed for agricultural pollution abatement. As noted in the introduction, the task of comparing tools is complicated by the multiple facets and dimensions embedded in each tool . While research suggests that a mix of policy tools will outperform any one instrument , clear strengths, weaknesses and unique traits distinguish tools from one another and should be taken into consideration when regulators choose means to meet environmental goals. Table 2-1 lists several categories by which to compare a select group of policy tools. As the table illustrates, a number of key relationships are particularly important. Emphasis is placed on the difference between tools tied to emissions and those not tied to emissions. The clear benefit of tools tied to emissions is their ability to track and measure environmental improvements. However, therein lies these tools’ biggest weakness: Reliance on proxies to predict the extent of environmental improvements.

The information burdens needed to construct models that adequately predict the impact of a farm’s discharges are so great that many practitioners and scholars have shrugged off the task as impossible. Encouragingly, a growing body of literature and scholarly discussions show prospect for improved computer simulation efforts. Until more robust models are designed with improved information, policymakers will continue to rely on the second category of tools—those not tied to emissions. Tools untethered to specific pollution targets work by encouraging water quality improvements through incentives, contracts and/or information. These tools tend to be more politically favorable, but less effective by themselves, save one—the dirty input limit. While capacity tools can provide important information to farmers and best management practices may improve water quality, the DIL can prevent pollutants from ever reaching rivers and lakes, or even farms. With the U.S. pesticide and storm water regulatory programs as models , regulating inputs has the potential to achieve more than regulating emissions. But the DIL is not without obstacles, including heavy reliance on scarce information to set the appropriate limitations and political will to restrict chemical or fertilizer production and/or use. Non-point source pollution, or pollution that comes from many diffuse sources, continues to contaminate California’s waters . Agricultural non-point source pollution is the primary source of pollution in the state: Agriculture has impaired approximately 9,493 miles of streams and rivers and 513,130 acres of lakes on the 303 list of waterbodies statewide . The 303 list is a section of the Clean Water Act mandating states and regions to review and report waterbodies and pollutants that exceed protective water quality standards. Agricultural pollution in California’s Central Coast has detrimentally affected aquatic life, including endemic fish populations and sea otters, the health of streams, and human sources of drinking water . Despite the growing evidence of agriculture’s considerable contribution to water pollution, the agricultural industry has, in effect, been exempt from paying for its pollution, and more importantly, has failed to meet water quality standards. How to best manage and regulate non-point source agricultural water pollution remains a primary concern for policymakers and agricultural operators alike. This case study focuses on the Conditional Agricultural Waiver in California’s Central Coast, the primary water pollution control policy in one of the highest valued agricultural areas in the U.S. The Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board is under increasing pressure to improve water quality within its jurisdiction, especially with the added onus from a 2015 Superior Court ruling that directed the Regional Board to implement more stringent control measures for agricultural water pollution. Pressure on the Regional Board is exacerbated by regulatory budget constraints, interest groups, and by unanticipated events. Given these pressures, choosing appropriate criteria by which to evaluate the success of California’s primary agricultural water quality policies is complicated, but of critical importance. This policy analysis explores the complex process of negotiations, agendas and conditions at the heart of policy-making, highlighting areas where the 2004 and 2012 Ag Waiver has succeeded in achieving its goals, as well as where it has fallen short. The analysis is divided into two parts.